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OCTOBER TERM, 1976 
No. 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY,' PETITIONER 
v. 
HmAM G. HILL, JR., ET AL. 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO'THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Tennessee 
Valley kutho'I'ity, petitions fot a writ of certiorari 
to review the judgment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in this case. 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The opiniOll" of the conrt of appeals (App. A, infra! 
pp. lA- 21A) is reported at 54,9 F. 2d 1064. The 
opinion of the district court (App. B, infra, pp. 22A-
44A) is reported in 419 F. Supp. 753. 
JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the court of appeals (App. C, 
infra, p. 45A) was entered on January 31, 1977. 
On April 22, 1976, Mr. Justice Stewart extended the 
(1) 
2 
time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to and 
including May 31, 1977. This Court's jurisdiction is 
invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether, when a species is listed under the En-
dangered Species Act of 1973, a federal water project 
that is substantially finished may be completed and 
used despite its adverse effects on the species if Con-
gress, with full knowledge of such effects, continues to 
approve the project by appropriating funds necessary 
for its completion. 
2. Whether the Endangered Species Act applies to 
a project substantially completed at the time of its 
enactment. 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 
Stat. 892, 16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1536 provides: 
The Secretary shall review other programs 
administered by him and utilize such programs 
in furtherance of the purposes of this Act. 
All other Federal departments and agencies 
shall, in consultation with and with the assist-
ance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities 
in furtherance of the purposes of this Act, 
by carrying out programs for the conservation 
of endangered species and threatened species 
listed pursuant to section 4 of this Act and 
by taking such action necessary to insure that 
actions authorized, funded, or carried out by 
them do not jeopardize the continued existence 
of such endangered species and threatened 
i 
\. 
( 
r 
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species or result in the destruction or modifica~ 
tion of habitat of such species which is deter-
mined by the Secretary, after consultation as 
appropriate with the affected States, to be 
critical. 
STATEMENT 
In 1966 Congress appropriated initial funds for the 
construction by the Tennessee Valley Authority 
("TV A") of the Tellico Dam and Reservoir project, 
a federal multi-purpose dam and reservoir on the 
Little Tennessee River. Construction began in March 
1967. The project has been funded annually thereafter 
and is now virtually completed and ready for use. 
In August 1973, when the construction was half 
completed, a species of three-inch fish (later to be 
named the snail darter) was discovered in the stretch 
of the river soheduled to be impounded by the reser-
voir. (App. B, infra, pp. 25A, 33A.) 1 
In December 1973 the Endangered Species Act of 
1973, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 1531 et seq., 
1 Darters, of which the snail darter is a type, are members of 
the perch family. There are about 130 known species of darters, 
85 to 90 of which are found in Tennessee. Eight to ten new ones 
have been discovered in the last five years, and about twelve dis-
covered in the last ten years. TVA's final environmental impact 
statement for the Tellico project (approved by the courts in 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 371 
F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn.), affirmed, 492 F. 2d 466 (C.A. 6» 
listed eleven species of darters known to o~ccur, or which may occur, 
in the portions of the Little Tennessee River to be impounded and 
noted that "new species continue to be discovered in Tennessee at 
the rate of about one per year." 
4 
was enacted. Section 7 of the Act, 16 U.S.C. (Supp. 
V) 1536, prov~des in relevant part that: 
[A]ll c* * * federal departments and agencies 
shall: in consultation with ·and with ~he assist-
ance of the Secretary [of the Interior], utilize 
their authorities in furtherance of the purposes 
of this Act * * * by taking such action 
necessary to ensure that 'actions authorized, 
funded or carried -out by them do not * * * 
result 'in the destruction or modification of 
habitat of [species listed as endangered or 
threatened] which is determined by the Secre-
tary * * * to be critical. 
Subsequently respondents and oth~rs petitioned t.he 
Secretary of the Interior to list the snail dart.er as 
an endangered species pursuant to Section 4 of the 
Act, 16 U'~S.C: (Supp. V) 1533. In November 1975, 
when approximately 75 percent of the construction 
was completed (App. B, infra, p. 33A), the Secretary 
designated the snail darter as an endangered species 
on the basis of his determination that the only known 
habitat of the fish was that portion of the Littie 
Tennessee River scheduled to be impounded by the 
Tellico Reservoir and that "[t]he proposed im-
poundment of water behind, tlie proposed Tellico 
Dam would result in total destruction of the snail 
darter's habitat.-" 40 Fed. Reg. 47506.2 In April 1976 
2 This determination was based 011 the finding that "the snail 
darter occurs only in the swifter portions of shoals over clean 
O'ravel substrate in cool, low-turbidity water. Food of the snail 
darter is almost exclusively snails which require a clean gravel 
substrate for their survival." Ibid. 
' t 
) , 
~I 
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5 
the - Secretary designated a portion of the River 
included within the area of the proposed reservoir as 
the snail darter's "critical habitat" pursuant to Sec-
tion 7 of the Act. 41 Fed. Reg. 13926. 
Tn February 1976 respondents filed this suit seeking 
to enjoin the completion of the dam and the impound-
ment of the reservoiJ:, alleging that those actions 
would violate Sections 7 and 9 of the Act, 16 U.S.C. 
(Supp. V) 1536 and 1538.3 
Prior to and during this litigation, TVA Board 
members testified before appropriations committees of 
the House and Senate. In hearings in April 1975 TVA 
informed those committees of the discovery of the 
snail darter and of efforts by opponents of the proj-
ect to halt its completion by relying on the Endan-
gered Species Act. TVA testified that in its view the 
Act did not prohibit the completion of a project 
authorized long before and substantially completed 
at the time the Act was passed, and stated that: 
[W] hile we will do our best to preserve the 
darter, if it in fact proves to be a distinct 
3 ·While respondents contended in both the district and appellate 
courts that the completion of the project would violate Section 9 of 
the Act, that question was not reached below (App. A, infra, pp. 
9A, n.13). Section 9 makes it unlawful to "take any [endangered] 
species within the United States." Section 9 does not apply here, 
since in defining the term "take" in Section 3 (14) of the Act, 
Congress deleted "the destruction, modification, or curtailment 
of its habitat or range" from the list of prohibited activities. 
Compare the original language of 3(6) of S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1973), with Section 3 (14) of the Act. 
• 
species and is listed as endangered, the project 
should be completed in any event * * *.4 
In recommending appropriations of $29 million 
for the project through September 1976, the House 
Committee on Appropriations, in its report dated 
June 20, 1975, stated 
The Committee directs that the project, for 
which an environmental impact statement has 
been completed and provided the Committee, 
should be eompleted as promptly as possible for 
energy supply and flood protection in the pub-
lic interest.5 
The appropriations bill was passed by Congress and 
signed by the President in December 1975, one month 
after the snail darter was placed on the endangered 
species list. Pub. L. 94-180, 89 Stat. 1035, 1047.
b 
In appropriations hearings in March 1976 TVA again 
informed both the House and the Senate committees 
about the status of the snail darter and about the 
recently filed lawsuit, and reiterated its position that 
the Endangered Species Act should not be construed 
4 Hearings on Public ·Works for ·Water and Power Developm.ent 
and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1976 before a Subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. Pt. 7, 467 (1975); see also Hearings Dn Public Works for 
'iV ater and Power Development and Energy Research Appropria-
tions for F iscal Year 1976 before a Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 4, 3775-
3777 (1975). 
5 H.R. Rep. No. 94-319, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975). 
6 The appropriations acts in this case constituted lump sum ap-
propriations for TVA, and do not themselves identify the projects 
for which the sums have been appropriated. Identification of these 
projects requires reference to the legislative history. 
7 
as prohibiting completion of the project.7 In addi-
tion, respondent Hiram Hill appeared before the 
House Committee, and gave a lengthy statement se-
verely criticizing the Tellico project and TVA's view 
of the Endangered Species Act, in which he concluded 
that "The project should be halted now and all un-
used funds for the project should be recalled" (Hear-
ings on Public Works for Water and Power Devel-
opment and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 
1977 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 8, 979-
984 (1976». 
With these statements before them, both the House 
and the Senate committees recommended the full 
Presidential budget request of $9.7 million for Tellico. 
In its report of June 17, 1976, the Senate committee 
made the following recommendation: 
TELLICO PROJECT 
The bill, as reported, contains the full $9.7 
million budget request for the Tellico project. 
7 TVA stated to both committees: "W· e are doing our best to pre-
serve the snail darter, and the results to date have been encoura<Y-
• b 
mg. ~T e cannot guarantee that the [attempt to transplant the 
species to another river] will ultimately be a success. In any event, 
we believe the Tellico project must be completed on schedule." 
Hearings on Public "Vorks for Water and Power Development 
and Energy Research Appropriation Bill, 1977 before a Subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess., Pt. 5, 260- 262 (1976); Hearings on Public Works for 
"Vater and Power Development and Energy Research Appropria-
tions for Fiscal Year 1977 before a Subcommittee of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 4, 3096- 3099 
(1976) . 
8 
During subcommittee hearings, TVA was ques-
tioned about the relationship between the Tel-
lico project's completion and the November 
1975 listing of the snail darter (a small 3-inch 
fish which was discovered in 1973) as an en-
dangered species under the Endangered Species 
Act. TVA informed the Committee that it was 
continuing its efforts to preserve the darter, 
while working towards the scheduled 1977 com-
pletion date. TVA repeated its view that the 
Endangered Species .Act did not prevent the 
completion of the Tellico project, which has 
been under construction for nearly a decade. 
The subcommittee brought this matter, as well 
as the recent U.S. District Court's decision up-
holding TVA's decision to complete the project, 
to the attention of the full Committee. ~ 
Committee does not view the Endangered Spe--cies Act as prohibiting the completion of the 
'Tellico project at its advanced stage and directs 
that this project be completed as promptly as 
possible in the public interest. [So Rep. No. 
94-960, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1976).] 
The appropriation bill passed both houses of Con-
gress on June 29 and was signed into law by the 
President on July 12, 1976. Pub. L. 94-355, 90 Stat. 
889, 899. 
The district cOl"irt, on May 25, 1976, denied peti-
tioner's request to enjoin the completion of the project 
and dismissed the complaint (App. B, infra). Al-
though the court found that impoundment of the res-
. ervoir would "result in the adverse modification, if 
not complete destruction of the snail darter's critical 
;habitat" (id. at 28A), it concluded that the En-
e, 
9 
dangered Species Act was not intended to prohibit 
the completion of a project substantially complete 
when the Act was passed (App. B, infra, p. 36A). The 
court further held that "a court of equity should not 
apply a statute enacted long after inception of the 
project to produce an unreasonable result" (id. at 
36A- 37A) . The court found support for its view in 
Congress' continued appropriations for the project 
with full knowledge of its effect on the snail darter. 
The court of appeals reversed (App. A, inf1'a). 
The court held that the Endangered Species Act ap-
plies fully to this project, that the evidence indicated 
that completion of the project and impoundment of 
the reservoir would violate Section 7 of the Act, and 
that the district court abused its discretion in refus-
ing to enjoin permanently the completion of the dam 
and the impoundment of the reservoir. The court 
refused to attribute any significance to the appro-
priations statutes of 1975 and 1976 or to the state-
ments of the House and Senate committees directing 
the completion of the project" as promptly as pos:ili-
ble in the public interest." The court held that those 
appropriations and statements did not constitute a 
"ratification" of the proposition that the Endangered 
Species Act was not intended to apply to the Tellico 
project, and that they were at best "advisory opiri-
ions" of certain members of Congress concerning the 
scope of the Act which could not bind the court" [i]£ 
the separation of powers doctrine is to maintain its 
vitality" (App. A, infra, pp. 15A- 16A) . 
10 
At the time of the trial (April 29-30, 1976) ap-
proximately $80 million had been invested in the proj~ 
ect and the project was 80 percent completed CAppo 
B, infra, p. 33A). As the district court found (id. 
at 31A) : 
The nature of the project is such that there are 
no alternatives to impoundment of the reser-
voir, short of scrapping the entire project. 
TVA has undertaken steps to transplant the snail 
darter to another river and evidence to date indicates 
that the species is surviving and reproducing there.7A 
However, even a f.?uccessful transplant would not re-
solve this case, .since, unless the Secretary of the 
Interior also found the species to be no longer en-
dangered, the Little Tennessee may continue to be a 
critical habitat of the species 8 (App. A, infra, p. 
19A). 
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT 
This case presents important questions concerning 
the proper application of the Endangered Species 
Act. Congress, in passing legislation after the Act, 
has explicitly, and with knowledge of the relevant 
facts, expressed an intention and directive that a 
specific federal project be completed notwithstand-
ing the provisions of that Act. Contrary to principles 
1ATV A introduced evidence at trial concerning its transplant 
efforts and made further, updated representations to the court of 
appeals in Supplemental Answers to Questions Asked During 
Oral Argument on the matter. 
8 Moreover, as TVA informed the court of appeals, "biologists 
generally consider several years of data necessary before they can 
- , 
'-\ 
-. ., 
11 
. of statutory -construction reflected in decisions of this 
Court and other courts of appeals, the court below dis-
regarded that legislation and thus thwarted Congress' 
express intent. 
The decision below has immediate consequences 
for the future of a major federal project, threaten-
ing not only the unrecoverable loss of millions of dol-
lars already expended in its construction but also the 
loss of millions of dollars of annual energy produc-
tion, flood control capacity and other economic 
benefits that the project was designed to bring to 
the people of the region. The decision would also 
have the broader consequence of restricting Con..:..- L..s -I(ez', 
gress' ability to limit, through appropriate leg-
islation, the application of a general statute to 
a specific project where it specifically deemed such ap-
plication to be contrary to the public interest, and 
.. 
would limit Congress in such cases to the more cum- '-." 
bersome and inappropriate legislative process of ex-
pressly amending or repealing the general. statute. 
forma conclusive judgment on the success of a transplant". TVA's () 
Supplemental Answers to Questions Asked During Oral Argu-
ment, p. 2. 
TVA has also petitioned the Secretary of the Interior to with-
draw his designation of the Little Tennessee River as a critical 
habitat of the snail darter on the basis of recent evidence indicat-
ing that the very existence of the dam, even without closure of the 
sluice gates, has made it impossible for the fish to return through 
the sluices already in place to its spawning grounds above the 
dam. To date the Secretary has taken no action on the petition and 
steps have been taken to preserve the status quo by removing snail 
darters from the river below the dam and replacing them above 
the dam. Accordingly, it is impossible to predict how or when that 
petition will be resolved. 
12 
The decision also presents important questions con-
cerning the application of the Endangered .species 
Act to projects substantially complete at the time of 
its enactment, and the exercise by the courts of their 
traditional equitable powers under the !Act. 
1.a. The court of appeals concluded that the lan-
-guage of Section 7 of the Endangered _Species 
Act prohibits the final completion of a project that 
threatens the critical habitat of an endangered species, 
and requires a federal court to enjoin such comple-
tion, regardless of the degree of completion of the 
-project when the Act was passed, the district court's 
-assessment of the propriety of an injunctive remedy, 
or the reasonableness of the responsible agency's eval-
_ uation of the public interest. ' Vhether that was Con-
gress' intention in passing the Act is an important 
and unsettled question, which we discuss below. See 
pp. 21-23, infra. Here, in any event, Congress sub-
sequently expressed a contrary intention in legislation 
dealing specifically with the project at issue. 
It is axiomatic that the function of the courts in 
construing legislation is to carry out the will of Con-
gress as best it can be ascertained, and that courts 
may consider all available and relevant matters in 
discerning congressional intent. See Train v. Colorado 
Public Interest Research Grot~p, Inc., 426 U.S. 1; 10; 
United States v. American Trucking Associations, 
310 U.S. 534, 543- 544. 
The legislative history of Congress' appropriations 
for TVA and the Tellico project could not more 
clearly demonstrate Congress' intent, with knowledge 
'. 
" 
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of the relevant facts, that the project be completed 
as quickly as possible notwithstanding the Endangered 
Species Act. That intent is expressly set forth in 
committee reports of both Houses of Congress/ and, 
as this Court has recognized, statements in committee 
reports are 8l1titled to particular weight in discerning 
the legislative will. United States v. International 
Union United Autorrwb£le, Aircraft and Agrict~Ztural 
I1nplement W orkeTs of America, 352 U.S. 567,585. 
The cour t of appeals, however, dismissed this explicit 
evidence of congressional intent as merely reflecting 
"[aJdvisory opinions" CAppo A, infTa, p. 15A), rely-
ing on the canon that "repeal by implication is dis-
favored," particularly when "the subsequent legisla-
tion is an appropriations measure" CAppo A, infTa, 
p. 16A ). The court's disregard of Oongress' stated 
intent is contrary to this Court's decision in United 
States V. DickeTson, 310 U.S. 554, and decisions of 
other courts of appeals concerning the effect of sub-
sequent appropriations legislation on earlier statutes. 
United States V. Dickerson, involved a 1922 statute 
authorizing and directing the payment of bonuses to 
servicemen who re-enlisted in the armed services. In 
1938 Congress passed a rider to the appropriations 
bill for the Rural Electrification Administration that 
provided that "'no part of any appropriation con-
tained in this or any other Act for the fiscal year end-
ing June 30, 1939, shall be available for the payment' 
9 The court of appeals erroneously characterized the statements 
in the committee reports "as pronouncements of two congressional 
appropriations subcommittees" (App. A, in/raJ, p. 18A). 
23-6-039- 77-2 
14 
] for 're-enlistments made 
[of any enlistment allowan~e e 30 1939, notwith-
during the fiscal year endmt~ Jun f [t~e 1922 Act].' " 
. th plicable por Ions 0 . 
standmg e ap 555 Although the 1938 approprm-
See 310 U.S. at. n~t ex ressly repeal the right to 
tions measure dId b the
P 
1922 statute for the 19~9 
bonuses conferred Y I d d on the basis of Its 
fiscal year, ~he CO~~~tC~~: ::a~ure was intended to 
legislative hIstory, f that year and re-
. ht to bonuses or , 
suspend the ~lg, t ntion that the words of the 
jected the claImant s .con e
t 
d so (310 U.S. at 562) : 
. t' act dId no 0 approprla Ions . d to 
be anomalous to close our mm s 
It woul.d . of intention on the ground 
persuasIve eVI~ence ld not differ as to the 
b1e men cou . 
that reasona d * . * * The meamng to be 
. of the wor s. b 
meanmg A t f Congress can only e 
'b d to an c 0 -. ascrl e . d ed weighmg of every 
derived from a conSI er. 
relevant aid to constructIOn. . 
1 for the Tenth Circuit applIed 
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485 F. 2d 1 .. 19~6 statute authorized the con-
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to prevent waters of Lake Powell from entering any 
National Monument" (485 F. 2d at 7). Although the 
appropriations measure did not expressly repeal, or 
even refer to, the prohibition in the 1956 act, or pro-
hibit efforts to contain the water, the court concluded 
that the legislative history of the appropriations meas-
ure indicated an intent to repeal the prohibition.10 
The principles of those decisions are fully appli-
cable here. The fact that Congress in the appropria-
tions acts did not expressly exempt the Tellico project 
from the provisions of the Endangered Species Act 
should not preclude the courts from determining that 
those acts and their legislative history demonstrate 
Congress' intent that the project be completed not-
withstanding its knowledge of the threat to the habi-
tat of a species and the claim that because of that 
threat the Endangered Species Act prohibits its com-
pletion. To disregard that evidence, as the court of 
appeals did, is simply to override Congress' will in 
-this matter. 
b. The court of appeals erred in concluding that the 
'statements in the committee reports were merely 
-' , advisory opinions" with respect to the meaning of 
10 See, also, Environmental Defense Food v. Oorp8 of Engineer8 
of the United States Army, 492 F. 2d 1123 (C.A. 5), where the 
.court held that Congress' passage of appropriations acts after 
being fully informed of the environmental effects of a project con-
stituted an authorization to proceed with the project and fore- ~ 
closed judicial inquiry into the adequacy of the impact statement 
under the National Environmental Policy Act. Cf. Mitchell v. 
Laird, 488 F. 2d 611 (C.A.D.C.); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 
-F . 2d.1307 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied, .416 l!''S' ~36; and DaOo8ta 1 
v. La~rd, 448 F. 2d 1368 (C.A. 2), certlOran dellIed, 405 U.S. 979, 
_holding that continued appropriations and other actions necessary 
I 
I 
the Endangered Species Act. Those statements were 
not) simply expressions of personal opinion by iso-
laf~d congressmen or senators concerning the meaning 
of a prior statute, i.e., the kind of "subsequent legis-
lative history" that this Court has found unpersuasive 
\ as evidence of Congress' intent when the statute was 
passed. See Regional Rail Reorgamization Act Cases, 
419 U.s. 102, 132. Rather they were statements in 
committee reports recommending specific _ legislation 
that Congress subsequently enacfed, presumably in 
reliance thereon. The Senate Committee's expres-
" I 
J".(!~l 
I 
sion of its intention in terms of not regarding "the 
Endangered Species Act as prohibiting the comple-
tion of the Tellico project" is immaterial. Its intent 
is clear that the Act sho~tZcl not prevent the comple-
tion of the project and that the project should "be 
completed as promptly as possible in the public inter-
est"-a view Congress endorsed when it enacted fur-
ther appropriations for that purpose.l1 
to maintain prosecution of the war in Vietnam reflected a congres-
sional assent to the war notwithstanding the absence of a formal 
declaration. 
11 The court of appeals' reliance (App. A, infra, pp. 16A-17A) 
310 U.S. ai; eBB, on House Rule XXI, which provides that no ap-
propriations bill "changing existing law [shall] be in order", is 
also erroneous. That rule merely permits a point of order to be 
raised and sustained with respect to appropriations legislation 
which affects existing law. It does not mean that appropriations 
legislation which does affect existing law is not effective legislation 
when, as he:re and as in Dickerson, supra, 310 U.S. at 558, n. 2, no 
(
point of order was raised. Indeed, the proposition that non-
compliance with a House rule invalidates legislation passed pur-
( suant to the constitutional process would raise a substantial 
~ constitutional question. 
A • \ 
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c. The court below also erred in disregarding the 
appropriations legislation on the basis of the canon 
that repeals by implication are disfavored. That canon 
of construction does not support the court's con-
.elusion in the circumstances of this case. 
It is of 'Course, well established that repeals by , -
implication are disfavored and that-
the only permissible justification for a repeal 
by implication is when the earlier and later stat-
utes are irreconcilable * * * [WJhen two 
statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the 
duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed 
congressional intention to the contrary, to re-
ff . * * * gard each as e ectlve. . 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-551. Further-
more, "the principle carries special weight when we 
are urged to find that a specific statute has been 
repealed by a more general one." United States v. 
United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 169. 
The present case, however, like United States v. 
Dickerson, s~~pra, and Friends of the Earth v. Arm-
strong, supra, illustrates the circumstances in which 
"repeal by implication" (or, more accurately, "selec-
tive exemption") is fully warranted. Here the purpose 
of the appropriations and the effect of the Endan-
gered Species Act, at least as contended by respond-
ents and construed by the court of appeals, are mu-
tually exclusive and ~l!y_irreconcilable. This is not 
a case in which a statute imposes requirements with 
respect to the manner in which a project is carried 
') J . "; :;1-" 
Ii. ' 
\ , 
'.r~ { .., 
1 
,I 
I 
I 
IS 
out (for example, equal employment practices, pro-
curement procedures or environmental impact stud-
ies), which, although perhaps adding to the burden, 
do not make its implementation impossible. In this 
case, given the fact of the snail darter's habitat in 
the Little Tennessee River, completion of the project 
by the impounding of the river would be impossible 
under respondents' view of the Endangered Species 
Act.12 Congress was aware of those facts and of re-
spondents' claims under the fAct when it directed the 
completion of the project "as promptly as possible" 
and appropriated funds for that purpose. In the cir-
cumstances of this case, therefore, to give effect to 
the alleged intent of the prior statute is necessarily 
to frustrate the purpose and intent of subsequent 
statutes. 
Moreover, this is not a case where a general statute 
is ,claimed to implicitly repeal specific statutes, but 
a case of s ecific statutes implicitly exempting a par-
-' ticular project from the claimed operation of a prior 
general statute. Accordingly, as this Court has recog-
nized, the usual considerations militating against re-
peal by implication are not present. United States v. 
United Continental Tuna Corp., supra. Unlike the 
former situation, the very specificity of the subse-
quent statutes serves to ensure that Congress contem-
12 As noted above, supra, p. 10, even a successful transplant of 
the species would not necessarily affect the designation of the Little 
Tennessee as one of its critical habitats, unless the species became 
so widespread as to warrant a determination by the Secretary of 
the Interior that it was no longer threatened or endangered. 
\ ..., 
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plated and intended the particular consequences Im-
plicit in its legislation. 
d. By mechanically rejecting the significance of ap-
propriations legislation, notwithstanding its ~_~~~~ pur-
pose, the court of appeals would deprive Congress of 
a r~e_and...Q.m2ropriate means of exempting a 
specific project from application of a general statute 
when Congress concludes that, in the particular cir-
cumstances, that application would not be in the pub-
lic interest. Congress, of course, could have amended 
or repealed the Endangered Species Act, either in 
general terms or by establishing and periodically add-
ing to a list of projects exempt from its provisions, 
and decisions like the one 'below may provide signifi-
cant impetus for it to do so. But Congress should 
not be required to debate the g~eral m~s of the 
Endangered Species Act in the context of each spe-
cific situation in which it may deem an exception to 
that Act's consequences to be required. It is cer-
tainly reasonable, and arguably preferable, for Con-
gress to choose to consider the pros and cons, includ-
ing the environmental impacts, of a particular project 
in the context of a legislative proceeding focusing on 
the specific facts of that project rather than on the 
broacl81' consequences of repealing or amending a 
general statute/3 The choice is, in any event, a matter 
18 This is particularly true in the case of TVA which, unlike 
other federal agencies, does not obtain special authorizing legis-
lation for its projects. Sections 4 (j) and 27 of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority Act, 16 U.S.C. 831c(j) and 831z, are general author-
izing statutes for such projects, and the appropriations committees 
alone recommend to Congress whether particular projects should 
or should not be built. 
/,. \.~\ 
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centrusted by the Constitution to the discretion · of 
Congress rather than the courts. In short, by restEict-
ing Congress' alternatives, the court of appeals, far 
- -from honoring the principle of the separation of 
powers, has failed to give due deference to the 
·Congress.14 
This question in this case concerning the effect of 
. appropriations legislation on general commands in 
,existing law has arisen in a number of contexts, par-
ticularly in recent years in connection with environ-
mental legislation. While each case depends on its 
particular facts, the courts of appeals have taken 
significantly divergent approaches to the problem. 
Some, like the court below, appear to view appropria-
tions legislation as virtually incompetent evidence of 
,congressional intent. See Committee For Nuclear Re-
sponsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F. 2d 783, 785 
-;, (C.A.D.C.); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
Froehlke, 473 F. 2d 346, 355 (C.A. 8). Others, ap-
plying the principles of United States v. Dickerson, 
.supra, have recognized its relevance. See Friends of 
the Earth v. Armstrong, supra; Environrrwntal De-
f ense FtfJnd v. Corps of Engineers of the United 
14 Although made in a markedly different context, the observa-
tions of the court of appeals in Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F. 2d 611, 
'u15 (O.A.D.C.), are pertinent in this regard. In concluding that 
acts by Congress other than a formal declaration of war may 
adequately demonstrate legislative assent to the prosecution of 
hostilities, the court said: "[W] e regard the Constitution as con-
templating various forms of Congressional assent, and we do not 
find any authority in the courts to require Congress to employ one 
rather than another form, if the form chosen by Congress be in 
itself constitutionally permissible." 
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States Army, supra. Accordingly, in view 0.£ the im-
portance of the Tellico project itself and the recur-
rence of this question in other contexts this Court , - , _. . 
should review the decision below. 
2. Apart from the effect of subsequent legislation, 
the decision below presents important and unresolved 
questions under the Endangered Species Act . 
Contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion, it is 
by no means clear that the language or purpose of 
the statute was intended to prevent an agency that has 
already "carried out" (Section 7) a program to its viJ;.:;. 
tualcompleti~when the Act was passed and a species 
lIs e from completing that project because the "com-
pletion" might modify the critical habitat of an endan-
gered species. If, for example, construction of a high-
way were finished on the day the Act was passed,. 
it is not clear that the Act was intended to pro-
hibit the responsible agency from opening the high-
way to traffic the next day be.cause the noise of the 
traffic might modify the critical habitat of a recently 
discovered endangered species. Although this is the 
first case to present that issue squarely under the-
Act, decisions under . comparable statutes support the· 
proposition that Congress did not intend su~h a con-
struction. As the court said with respect to the N a-
tional Environmental Policy Act in Arlington Coali-
tion on Transportation v. Volpe, 458 F. 2d 1323, 1331 
(C. A. 4), certiorari denied sttb nom. Fugate v. Arling-
ton Coalition on Transportation, 409 U.S. 1000: 
At some stage, federal action may be so "com-
plete" that applying the Act could be con-
22 
sidered a "retroactive" application not intended 
by Congress.15 
Furthermore, both the statutory language and its 
legislative history suggest that incases where a proj-
ect cannot be "carried out" at all within the meaning 
of Section 7 without some modification of a critical 
habitat, the agency responsible for the project retains 
the responsibility (subject to review for abuse ·of 
discretion) for assessing the competing interests in 
light of the purposes of the Act.16 
Finally, the district court here declined to enjoin 
"'f\ \ ' \ ,completion of the project on the basis of its careful 
f!..,"{' 0v \>A~ssessment of all the competing considerations, Jn~ 
' 'y J.fV eluding the extenCof 'the project's completion, TVA's 
''0".s. \'~ \ good faith efforts to conserve the snail darter and 
~vl , \ 
\. IY0'\ . 
\,} G' 
15 See also, Ragland v. Mueller, 460 F. 2d 1196 (C.A. 5) ; En-
vil'onmental Defense Fund v. Oorps of Engineers of the United 
States Army, 470 F. 2d 289 (C.A. 8), certiorari denied, 412 U.S. 
931; Pizitz, Inc. v. Volpe, 467 F . 2d 208 (C.A. 5); Greene Oounty 
Planning Ed. v. Federal Power OO1n1nission, 455 F. 2d 412, 424 
(C.A. 2), certiorari denied, 409 U.S. 849; Environmental Defense 
F1l11d v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F. 2d 1164, 1179 (C.A. 6). 
16 See e.g., 119 Congo Rec. 256\J0 (1973), in which Senator Tun-
ney, one of the sponsors of the Act, stated, "[Ah I read the lan-
guage [of Section 7J there has to be consultation [between the 
agency and the Secretary of the Interior]. However, the Bureau 
of Public Roads or any other agency would have the final decision 
as to whether such a road should be built." See also the Depart-
ment of the Interior's proposed regulations published January 26, 
1977, to the effect that the Act was not intended to "bring about 
the waste that can occur if an advanced project is halted" and that 
\ the "affected agency must decide whether the degree of comple-
tion and extent of public funding of particular projects justify 
an action that may be otherwise inconsistent with section 7." 42 
Fed. Reg. 4869. 
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'Consult with other concerned agencies, and Congress' 
intent reflected in its continued appropriations. The 
court of appeals' determination that the district court 
abused its discretion presents the significant question 
whether Congress intended in the Act to deny the 
courts equitable discretion in deciding whether to 
grant Injunctive remedies under the Act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ 
of certiorari should be granted. 
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